Barbara Lopez
Professor Lipsker
HUM 103
22 November 2024
Dissecting Choreopolice
In Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: Or, the task of the dancer André Lepecki uses Hannah Arendt’s understanding of “politics” as freedom to transform “choreography” from its typical definition of controlled movement. Lepecki argues that dancers can utilize choreography as a means of moving politically within a “contemporary control [society]” (19)—a society in which methods of behavioral regulation are internalized rather than tangible—to challenge enforced norms and prescribed routes of circulation for the conception and maintenance of freedom. The section in conformity, moving along, breaks down the components that define the term “chorepolice.” Lepecki uses Jacques Rancière’s definition of “police” and Michel Foucault’s notion of conformity to define “choreopolice” as a concept of movement that veers away from political expression, or freedom. By devising “choreopolice,” Lepecki accurately encapsulates the deeply embedded self-policing of society that deprives individuals of true freedom, proving the necessity of obtaining power through movement.
It is through the usage of different philosophers’ notions that Lepecki derives the meaning of “choreopolice” to illustrate the dynamics of police and conformity in relation to the enactment of freedom. Rancière’s interpretation of “police” is understood by Lepecki to transcend “its specific actors, whether street cops or mounted anti-riot police” (19). “Police” is now understood not to be an officer of some kind but is instead categorized as following “[predetermined] pathways [and] [established] routes for circulation,” (19) clarifying how Lepcki defines policing as a course of action and not a particular individual. Foucault uses the notion of conformity, or “the rectification and implementation of a generalized [behavior],” (19) to insinuate the self-policing aspect of “choreopolice.” Lepecki attributes the action of conforming and policing to be the individual’s fault and not of external societal forces, such as other individuals. It is every individual acting on their own accord promoting a “consensual mobility” (19) that constrains everyone from moving politically or freely in a society.
Lepecki’s usage of philosophies is not only limited to the concept of conformity but also applies to the way he perceives the structure of society. Giles Deleuze’s concept of “control societies” is essential to elucidating “choreopolice,” as the policing here is done pervasively rather than through explicit structural forms of command. According to Delueze, domination of individuals does not occur through violence or other authoritative figures, but rather through the transgression of an individual’s freedom and/or power to a larger institution by their own will. Establishing society as a “control society” strengthens Lepecki’s idea that it is inevitable for an individual to conform their behavior to what is deemed “normal,” emphasizing “choreopolice” as a mode of entrapment. Subtle coercion then stems from each individual subconsciously, or consciously, choosing to conform. Lepecki is then led to believe that a society that thinks itself as “free” as actually being “[impoverished] of choreographic imagination” (20) where the citizens cannot even comprehend the idea of moving otherwise. For Lepecki, this is a method of regulation that choreographs normative movements to ultimately impede the initiation of any other kind of movement besides what is prescribed– or “choreopolicing.”
To emphasize the definition of “choreopolice,” Lepecki defines “choreopolitics” in contradistinction. Both notions have the same beginning of “choreo,” followed by terms that oppose each other through their approach to movement. Applying Arendt’s translation of politics as freedom, it is implied that “choreopolitics” regards the ability to move freely in comparison to “choreopoliced” movement. To further distinguish “choreopolitics,” Lepecki describes it as requiring the “redistribution and reinvention of bodies, affects, and sense,” (20) calling for new ways of moving and being, which extremely contrasts “choreopolice.” Lepecki designates “the dancer” as the vessel of “choreopolitics” and states that they can “[transform] spaces of circulation into spaces of freedom” (20). Dancers are able to move freely even within choreographed movements, as Lepecki points out that dance is “unforeseen,” thus rejecting the prescribed circulation of a space. Even if a space is created for dance, its function cannot be narrowed down to one specific choreography. This element of rejection that underlies “choreopolitics” is not found in “choreopolice,” which is entirely dependent on the enforcement of conformity.
Having set up a lens in which society is viewed to be powered by the dynamics of conformity and dissimilarity, Lepecki creates a problem that requires both a name and a solution. The problem is that there is something obstructing the ability of individuals to move freely, an issue he labels as being “choreopoliced.” In explaining how this term works and the philosophies that it originates from, Lepecki clarifies that the source of this issue is none other than ourselves. The solution Lepecki poses to this problem is “choreopolitics,” “a movement whose only sense (meaning and direction) is the experimental exercise of freedom” (20). Choreography implies the idea of the control and measurement of movement but is not usually thought of outside the context of dance. Lepecki fixes this issue and revolutionizes the term when he joins it to the philosophical underpinnings of police and politics. With his connection to choreography, he is able to introduce the dancer as an agent that has the obligation to shift society from a choreopoliced one to a choreopolitical one.
The obligation of autonomy is suggested through Lepecki’s understanding of how a society can work towards achieving the ability to move politically—the individual’s pursuit of total freedom. The passage of in conformity, moving along explicates what Lepecki claims has caused the inability to attain freedom—“choreopolice.” Since a society is a collective of individuals, the habitual actions of those individuals are what define the society. If these individuals lack the ability to move freely, then society will be unable to progress past the condition its individuals are subjecting themselves to. “Choreopolice” is how Lepecki depicts the danger of an individual not having autonomy, the inability to move as one desires.
Though Lepecki uses dancers as his subject, he is calling for everyone to personally find the urge to move politically—dance is just one of the most prevalent ways in which this can occur. It becomes apparent that Lepecki believes individuals should not hinder themselves if they want to be able to exist freely. As both “choreopolice” and “choreopolitics” focus on the actions of the individual, it is an inherent personal issue that affects society as a whole. Valuing oneself enough to reject the deep-rooted control techniques is a conception one must have and can achieve, as “somehow, somewhere, someone always finds a way to move politically” (20). In articulating this perspective, Lepecki alludes to the fact that autonomy is an invaluable aspect for a society to become absolutely free.
Works Cited
Lepecki, André. “Choreopolice and Choreopolitics: Or, the Task of the Dancer.” MIT Press, MIT Press Direct, 2013; 57: 4 (220), 13–27.www.researchgate.net/publication/265717475_Choreopolice_and_Choreopolitics_Or_the_task_of_the_dancer.
